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In Accordance with E. O. 12958

22 January 1965

on_____NOV 26 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with

re CORONA Agreement

In the fourth of a series of meetings with the status of the CORONA Agreement and the problems which we were encountering with the Air Force on the West Coast. During the course of the meeting, our displeasure was evidenced to bagging job he did on us and General Carter over the for the sandlatest draft agreement. The draft in question had been written from own words and contained what he had advertised as a few nit-picking corrections by Dr. McMillan. Eager to get the agreement consummated, we had pushed the agreement through General Carter restating claim that it was alright with McMillan. At the ExCom meeting on 12 January, General Carter told Dr. McMillan that the agreement was fine with him and that he had signed it, whereupon Dr. McMillan withdrew his vote of agreement and said that he was only "in general accord with it."

2. apologized profusely for this; however, we took the opportunity to turn the screws on this issue whenever it benefited our position. It did not take long for the meeting to reach a rather frank discussion whereupon we aired our grievances of the activities of the Pentagon and tion. We stated that while organizawas "smoking the peace pipe" with us here in Washington, the Indians on the West Coast were hitting us from all sides. pertinent issues which we called him on were the unauthorized transmission of the explicit direction to the contrary by Secretary to Vance and General Carter. Further, that other messages were being sent to outside the normal CORONA transmission procedures effective 30 November 1964; and that in spite of our objections, attempted repeatedly to contact our contractors directly with tasks and directions. Further, that also attempted to levy requirements directly on

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- as far as he was concerned, the actions here in Washington were merely delaying tactics until such time as the STC could develop a computer programming capability satisfactory enough to replace the AP, and in view of the violations of all the agreements and procedures which we have had to date, there has been nothing to suggest that this fear is unwarranted.

 STC could very possibly assume this function; however, it was not the NRO's intention to duplicate this facility in either cost or talent and assured us that it would not happen.
- 4. When the smoke cleared, agreed to the following and stated that Dr. McMillan was also in agreement:
 - (1) that the control (the senior CIA CORONA representative) would be a deputy director of the CORONA project for the payload reporting directly to
 - (2) that all CIA CORONA activities would be consolidated under this CIA representative;
 - (3) that security would mean not only the physical plant security, but also the determination of access to the plant as well as "need to know" for project clearances;
 - (4) that the camera on-orbit programming and payload operation would remain the responsibility of the AP facility and would be directly responsive to the SOC/NRO:
 - (5) that all technical direction for the payload contractors and other CIA contracts would come from the senior CIA representative or duly authorized representative;
 - (6) that would provide technical advice to the senior CIA man when and if required.
 - (7) that the senior CIA man, of course, would be responsible also to the DCI for controlling and directing the CIA assets in the CORONA program.

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Although also agreed that the senior CIA man should be chairman of a payload CCB and sit as a member responsible for the payload to an overall systems CCB, he stated that Dr. McMillan was in general accord with what was meant, but he wasn't sure that he (Dr. McMillan) liked the terminology.

- stated that he would take these major points and fold them into two or three agreements and present them to Dr. McMillan, hoping that one of the agreements would contain the terminology or pharaseology acceptable to Dr. McMillan, at which point he would ask Dr. McMillan to initial off on such an agreement and he, in turn, would take it to us for our consideration. He assured us that he would be back in touch with us on the CORONA agreement before 27 Jan. He also promised us that he would contact the West Coast and advise them not to contact our contractors directly. but to come through the Agency assets and also that they should not task directly, but come through Washington. Further, he would abide by the operational procedures effective on 30 November, except for the which he said are continuing at Dr. McMillan's direction. He stated that it wasn't his intention to circumvent the normal operating procedures; however, some of the cases which we hearkened to as violating operating procedures were actually attempts by him to do long-range planning analysis. We enthusiastically agreed that such was necessary and certainly such tasking of would be necessary, but we suggested that he so state in a preamble to the message that it was a planning analysis exercise and, hence, not one proper for the normal procedures. He stated that he would gladly do this and either devise a slug for such occasions or prepare a lead-in sentence.
- as to his reaction to the briefing at Itek on Monday, 18 January, and what comments Dr. Fubini or Dr. McMillan had. He skirted a direct answer on this, but did state that all were assured of the need for such a system, that the technical accomplishments were amazing, but that it was still a very complex system and the question remains whether it is the best configuration to perform the search function. The meeting concluded on a friendly

note, although at times during the meeting tempers fluctuated somewhat. The modus operandi scheduled for these meetings is a hot and cold treatment to ensure that our points are made forcefully, yet the open hand of conciliatory action is always available.

